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THE  COt-1MUNITYiS  ROLE  IN  THE  WORLD 
It is with great pleasure  that  I  accepted  your 
invitation to  speak  to you  tonight.  It is the  second  time 
that I  have  addressed this distinguished audience"  In 
:J\)Vember  1977,  almost  a  year.  into my  mandate  as  ?:···:c-::,:Lde:l.t 
of the Connnission,  I  offered  you  a  number  of  t:b~:-;t:ghts  on 
the problems which were  besetti.ng  the  Community  anu  thei'.r 
repercussions  for our relations with third countriesa  Three 
years  on  I  think it would  be useful  to  have  anoti.2r  1cok at 
the role of the  Community  in the world,  and  to  e~<.a::line  a 
selection of the major  issues  ~vhich demonstra1.::e  how  that 
ro~e is changing  and  developinge 
.  ··.  ...  .  -(  -:...  .. 
The  role of the  Community  in relations with third 
countries is  govern~d partly by  the Trecties,  and  partly  ~y 
the  case  law of political co-operation.  On  the  one  hand 
there are the external responsibilities  de:..,.clved  by  the 
Treaties to  the  Community's  institutions.  This  concerns 
not only the Economic  Community  but  also  the  Coal  and 
Steel  Community  and  EURATOMQ  Here  the  Commission  plays 
the major part.  These  external responsibilities  extend 
from  framework  agreements  for  economic  co-operation,  to 
trade questions,  scientific and  technological  co-operation, 
environment and transport  ~~tters, and fisheries agreements. 
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They range  from  the renegotiation of the  Lome  Convention 
with  59  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific countries  to  the 
conclusion of an agreement with one  country to  suspend 
a  tariff reduction on  tomato  concentrate.  Naturally 
the policies promoted  by  the Treaties  have  more  general 
consequences  and  repercussions.  As  our common  policies 
have  developed,  so their impact  on  the rest of the world 
has  developed too. 
On  the other hand  there is political co-operation. 
Political co-operation is now  some  ten years  old,  half the 
age of the  Conmn.1nity,  itself a  very young  institution. 
It does  not  depend upon  Treaty but·is the result of decisions 
by Foreign Ministers.  It does  not have  institutions;  it 
has  no  infrastructure or  permanent  staff;  and its decisions, 
which are taken-by consensus,  represent political not  legal 
commitments.  But  in its brief life political co-operation 
has  already done  much  to bring together the  foreign policies 
of the nine Member  States,. and  to ensure  an effective 
;.  .. 
co-ordination even in areas where  Member  States prefer to 
operate individually  •. 
There is also what  might  be  described as  the  grey area 
of mixed  competence  where  some  part of the responsibility 
rests with the  Community  and  some  part rests with the Member 
States.  Over recent years  co-or9ination between  the work 
of the Community  and  the work of political co-operation 
has  greatly improved"  That is important.  After all, 
both are  emanations  of a  single thought,  the desire of the 
Member  States of the Community  to ·work  together and  speak 
to others with a  single voice or at least in chorus. 
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This  evening I  take  three  subjects  to illustrate how 
all this works.  First our trade policy and,  in particular, 
our relations with Japan;  second  the  North/South dialogue 
with its many  implications  for  the whole world  economic 
system;  and last that traditional area of European  concern 
the Middle  East. 
Trade is the  Community's  business.  It stands  four-
square within its responsibilities under the treaties.  Only 
a  year ago,  we  were  congratulating ourselves  on  the 
successful  conclusion of theMultilateral Trade  Negotiations, 
the  Tokyo  Round.  That was  in many  ways  a  remarkable 
achievement.  Throughout  these negotiations,  whic!-..  were 
conducted in the  framework  of the  Generalised  Ag;~(.'.cment: 
on Tariff and  Trade  (GATT),  the  Cormnunity  spok~ ,.,.:f.th  one 
voice.  Even  though it is the Member  States and  not  the 
Community  which are parties to  GATT,  it was  the  Comm1nity, 
: re.pres·ented  by  the  Corninission,  which negotiated and  concluded 
the  agreements  binding the Member  States. 
These negotiations were  perhaps  the most  ambitious 
and certainly the most  complex ever  launched. 
five  and  a  half years  of painstaking argument. 
They  took 
They  took 
place during a  period of economic  retrenchment,  much  less 
favourable  to free  trade  than perhaps  any  since  the war. 
In times  of economic  expansion it is relatively easy to 
secure reductions  in obstacles to trade.  For  example it 
is less likely that imports will create fears  about 
unemployment  or the failure of local enterprises.  To 
/resist 
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resist the pressures of protectionism is far more  difficult 
in times of recession combining high unemployment with high 
rates of inflation.  Add  to this soaring energy costs,  and 
1979 was  not  the most  propitious year for the  conclusion 
of a  major world-wide  trading agreement.  -The  Cornrrn.mi ty, 
the United States and  Japan were  the prime  movers  in giving 
genuine momentum  to  the negotiations  from mid-1977  onwards. 
It falls primarily to  them  to  give  full and  fair ef:Eect 
to the results we  eventually achieved. 
The  significance of the Tokyo  Round  lies in setting 
new  and more  stringent rules  for world trade,  and within 
this new  framework  substantial trade liberalisation.  Bv 
"' 
. this  I  mean  the lowering of customs duties and  the  enactment 
- of codes  aimed at reducing non-tariff barriers.  The 
Community  remains  committed to maintaining an  open world 
trading system.  Once  protectionism is allowed  to  take  a 
grip,  the temporary and  short-lived relief that may  result 
for  some  hard-pressed sectors will not  prevent a  continuing 
industrial decline.  - Protectionism does  not  cure 
recession.  Ultimately it tends  to accelerate it.  It is 
often self-defeating with the .effect not  of saving the life 
of an enterprise but of postponing its death.  It maintains 
~rtificially high and  uncompetit~ve prices on the domestic 
market,  and  therefore  fuels  inflation.  It destroys  incentives 
for  innovation and modernisation.  On  the international 
level it provokes retaliation and  loss of foreign markets • 
The  arguments  are nonetheless difficult to  bring home  to 
those who,  faced with competition from third countries,  are 
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losing their jobs within the  Community  and  have  to witness 
the cloBure of factories which  gave  them their livelihood. 
At  present  the  Japanese  seem  to  be  carrying Im.lch  of 
the  blame  for  the  problems which have arisen.  There  has 
been  a  marked  increase in the  penetration of certain 
Jqpanese  goods,  in particular cars,  into our market,  and  our 
trad~ deficit with Japan has  grown  so  fast  that it could 
r :.ach  nine or even ten billion dollars  by  the end  of this 
year.  I  should  say clearly at the outset that in our view 
:~.c  y;ould  be  quite wrong to make  the Japanese  the  SL.ap(;gaats  ~, 
,_-or  :mr  own  failures.  The  development  of the Japanese 
econcmy  has  been remarkable,  and  the priorities the  Japanese 
~-1ave  placed on  advanced  technology,  and  the  conclusions 
tbcy  have  drawn· for  their economic  management,  cor:tcin 
less~ns for us all.  I  wish that European  industry '..ras 
equally energetic,  ingenious,  determined  and  far-sighted. 
Nevertheless an imbalance  has  developed  in the  economic 
relation~hip betw~en the  Connnunity  and  Japan which  can no 
longer be  igno~ed.  It has political as well  as  economic 
implications,  and  cannot  be left simply to right itself. 
I  do  not  have  to draw attention to  the effects  on certain 
sectors of the European market with corresponding effects 
on enployrnent.  In  some  cases  the  fault  can  be  attribut~d 
- . 
to lower  European productivity,  higher manufacturing costs 
and  insufficient marketing efforts.  But  this is not 
always  the case.  We  could more  easily tolerate  the  success 
of Japanese  goods  in our market if we  were  able  to  claim 
corresponding success  for our goods  in the Japanese market. 
/Here 
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Here we  are n·Jt  alwayf,  given a  fair chance  to  compete. 
The  Japan~f,e market  is not  completely closed,  but  there 
are barriers to  trace,  usually of a  non-tariff kind,  which 
have  the effect:of blocking off parts of the  Japanese 
market;  where  Cor.mrun1ty  goods  could reasonable  compete. 
~ .._  I  ,  :,  ., '  ! 
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The  Commission is doing all it can  to underpin  the efforts 
of our  business-men  and  traders in Japan.  We  have  programmes 
for  trade missions and market  studies.  We  will do  our 
best,  and we  look  for  a  Japanese  response. 
Co-operation with Japan  in political as  in economic 
matters  is of increasing importance.  The  Japanese  have 
come  to play a  bigger role in the management  of the  free 
world  economic  system.  That was  evident in the  Tokyo 
•  tri  ) 
Round  negotiations.  It is evident in the series of 
Economic  Summits  which  have  taken place over the last  few 
years.  Understanding  between the major industrial  powers 
is vital to the health of·all  •  It applies as  much  to 
. ~ :  .... ·  - ' 
·co~operation between us  as  to co-operation with regard to 
the rest of the world.  If the relationship between the 
United States,  Japan and  the  Corrnnunity  can  be  described 
as  a  triangle,  we  want  the line which links  the  Cormm.1nity 
to  Japan to  be  strengthened all the way  along.  Obviously 
we  could not accept discrimination which  seemed  to  favour 
the  Japanese  trading relationship with the  United  States 
at the expense of the  Japanese  trading relationship with 
the Conmn.mity.  Only  on  a  stable and non-discriminatory 
economic  base  can we  build that closer political relationship 
with Japan which  I  believe to  be  greatly in the interest 
of both. 
•I[ 
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Here  I  would like to  say  a  word  to our Member  States. 
The  Japanese  sometimes  tell us  that  they do  not know  to 
whom  to address  themselves  in Europe.  Should it be  the 
Community  through its executive agent  the  Commission? 
~  -,. 
i 
~~ 
Or  should it be  the Member  States,  some  of whom  still have. 
complicated and  in our view  out of date bilateral arrangements 
with Japan?  I  feel  strongly that the reply is that  the 
Community  should work out a  more  co-ordinated approach to 
Japan in the interests of Europe as a  whole.  In  t.!.:i8 
fa~hion the  Japanese will  be  less  tempted to play  or.e 
Member  State off against  the other,  and  the Member  States 
will be  less  tempted  to  seek meagre national advantages 
iL dealing with Japan.  It rarely does  them  rnuc:r~  good. 
Indeed it should be  firmly established that what  gees  for 
one Member  State must  go  for all. 
/I tum 
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the  North/South dialogue.  I  take  this  as  an  exa  ..  :np~.e  of 
the  complexity of  the  r:wtters  with  which  the  Cormmmity  and 
' 
scarcity of  rav7  mnt:~.::ci  r  ·-·  above  all_  the  econcmic 
recession  DO'i.v  ccffecting  c_]  1  co1...mtri ::' s  have  orofou.ndl  v  ch.::m
0cred 
'  ~  l'  . 
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the geo-politics of  the  '1.-.ur  Tne  first difficulty is  to 
define  the  terms. 
The  North-South  uialogue  -"l.nd  its product  the  Global 
Negotiation cover  a  m~.Jltitucl:?  of r:aj:Jr  iss.J.es.  There  are 
no  tidy geographica.i  ~  tc  sort out  the  interest involved. 
We  live in  a  r:1Ultip0 1 ar  \Jc~>J.  r:orth  ta.lks  to  l\orth,  South  to 
of  a  dialogue  lx::: t'I-V2e"':  (L::ve).c::ped  and  dev"= loo.Lng  co'.mtries,  or 
Some  of  the 
, 
so-called developing  coutlt:ies  have  created  in recent  years 
tre:::  .. ?:.:dously  :.;uccessfu.L  iE'-Lc--:tries;  v.·hile  11·1  s0r::c  o:l:.'  the 
and 
soms  of  their 
'The  truth  toe'""  is  ;::..t  the  tvorlci  £ _:_nds  itself in 
circumstances  which  escape  ... esent  categoric  s  and  definitions. 
::·Lch  ccuntri.es;,  ::::nd  ].'X):>~·  regions  and 
resonrces,  in particular  (,yt.~ro-·carbons~  on  \~ilich  ,.·,e  economic 
activities of  the rest of 
have  0.0 t.  \.Je  have  those  produce  food,  , nd  thc·SP  vlno 
procuce  raw materia:ts,  tho:;e  \d"lo  prod·ace.  r;:,~,·-~utact.<::.-c·:-~rs,  thosE .·~ 
So  far  the  international negotiations for  some  sort 
of new  economic  world order have  been frustrating.  Diplomats 
and politicians have  exhausted  themselves  in long-drawn 
parleys.  Many  have  become  irritated and  disappointed. 
This is partly because of  the  wide  differences of  approach, 
and still more  of expectation.  It is no  good  the 
industrial countries  thinking  that things  can continue 
broadly as  they are,  and  that disbursement of  aid in its 
·vro:·ious  forms  can play  a  major or even  a  minor  part in 
cupirt:;·  with  the  enormous  and growing  problems of  the  t:;:.:-eater 
pa:r:t of mankind.  We  live in one  small vulnerable  pla:1et in 
.. 
whi.ch  the  problems of one  are  the  problems' bf atl  ~·:·  rt is no 
g'ood  the  poorer countries  thinking  that they can  change  the 
rules of the  international economic order  overni~~;l1  t  to  their 
advantage,  above  all at a  time of industrial recession  and 
unemployment.  It is no  good  the oil producers  thinking  that  they 
can safely invest their profits in the  industrial  countr~es 
while  leaving  to  the  industrial countries  the responsibility 
for recycling revenues-from oil.  It is no  good  the 
Communist  countries  thinking  that the  problems of  the  third 
world  are  a  kind of capitalist plot and  confining  their own 
efforts  to  sal.eE:>  of  armaments  and  the  struggle for  power  and 
influence. 
The  Community  has  a  special role  to  play.  By  history, 
tradition and interest it is more  linked than  any  other 
industrial grouping with  the rest of  the  world.  It already 
has  a  treaty relationship with E.O  relatively poor  countries 
through  the  Lome  Convention.  It neither Wishes  to  cling  to 
the old order,  nor  to  endorse  some  of the  cruder blue-prints 
for  a  new one.  It has  a  specific contribution to make 
/not only in terms ' . 
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not only in terms of  aid  and  trade  but in helping  to  devise 
that new world economic  system which is clearly necessary. 
But if it is to  be  effective, it must  speak  and  act  as  one. 
We  need  an  approach of  the kind which  proved  so  useful at 
the  Conference  on International Economic  Cooperation at 
Paris in 1977.  We  also need  better mutual  understanding 
and  coordination between all industrial countries.  I 
hope  very much  this will  be  one of the  products of  the' 
Economic  Summit meeting  at Ottawa next year. 
My  third example  is the Middle  East.  The  Declaration 
on  the Middle  East which was  adopt~d by  the  European Council 
in Venice  last June  had more  significance  ~han most have 
yet recognised.  On  the  one  hand it served  to mark  the  place 
of  Europe  in an  area now  as  ever critical to  European 
interests;  and  on  the other it gave  a  new  dimension  to  the 
coordination of European foreign  policy within political 
cooperation. 
I  do  not want  to  go  too far into  the  substance of  the 
matter.  I  would  say· simply that there is much  common 
· ground  between  the  process  launched at Camp  David  and  the 
ideas  set out in the  Venice  Declaration.  Both  look for  a 
comprehensive  settlement  based on Security Council 
Resolutions  No  242  and  238.  Botb call for recognition of 
the right to  existence within secure  borders of all states 
in the  area,  and  of  the  legitimate rights of  the  Palestinian 
people.  But at Venice  'tve  went  a  little further  than was 
possible at Camp  David.  t~e  spoke of  borders  being 
guaranteed  and of  the readiness of  the  Nine  to  participate 
in a  ·system of guarantees.  We  spoke of  the  need for 
involvement of all the parties,  including  the Palestinian 
/Liberation Organisation. -s..  (  ..... 
Liberation Organisation.  We  drew attention to  the  problem 
of Jerusalem.  But  the real novelty was  to move  from words 
to  action.  At  the  end of  the  Venice  Declaration the 
Nine  announced  their intention to make  contact with all 
-
the  parties concerned with  a  view to  ascertaining  their 
views  and,  in the  light of  the results,  to  determine  the 
form which  a  European initiative could  take.  This  meant 
that the  Nine  undertook  an operation which confronted the 
rn.ar.hinery of political cooperation with  a  need  to  conduct 
;,~  ::;ustained diplomatic initiative.  The  Foreign IvtL-:. '>s ter 
of the  country holding  the Presidency - Gast.::n.  '!ho.cn,  my 
·;u(::cessor  as President of  the  Commission.._  took-re::i:ponsibility 
~or a  mission of remarkable if not unique  importance.  He 
h.:L;  now  completed his round of contacts.  We  h:-r;e  to 
reflect on  the results  and  consider further  wh.1t  kind of 
initiative we  might  take. 
This  leads me  to  consider  the nature of  political 
cooperation as it has  evolved  so  far.  The  s·LJ.ccess  we 
have  achieved  sho.uld-not  blind us  to  the real limits  and 
constraints under  which political  cooperati~n operates. 
This is territory where  goverrunents  are  at their most 
.  ' 
sensitive:  that of political sovereignty.  Political cooperation 
does  not in practice extend  to  a~l  impo~tant foreign 
policy questions  although  the range of subjects  covered is 
constantly expanding.  The  process remains  primarily one 
of cooperation and not of integration.  It is based on 
consensus,  and in the  absence of  a  consensus Member 
States are free  to  act individually.  There  are  practical 
difficulties,  in particular,  the  absence of  a  permanent 
infrastructure.  Political cooperation has  no  seat. 
/Every six months Every  six months its meetings  switch to  the  capital 
of the Member  State  taking over  the Presidency.  Nevertheless, 
over  the years,  governments  have  developed  a  kind of 
Community reflex and political cooperation has established 
itself increasingly well.  I  believ~ we  must  build on 
that basis. 
What  are  the  prospects for  future  developnent of 
political cooperation?  This  has  been  a  subject of 
considerable debate  already.  I  was  interested  to  see 
a  distinguished  book on  the  subject by  the  Chef  de  Cabinet 
of  the  Belgian Ministerfu1.·  Foreign .Affairs.  Some  Ministers 
have  also expressed  themselves  on  ·~th~  subje_ct.  It is 
of course  primarily for governments,  but I  thought it might 
be  worthwhile  to  set out  some  of my  own  views,  based as 
they are on  some  experience over  the  last four years. 
As  so often in matters of  pol~tical importance  a 
procedurcil  and  administrative  problem masks  problems of tvider 
political significance.  In the first instance  the 
principal difficulty  ~bout political cooperation is  that 
the machinery risks  becoming over-loaded  by  increasing 
responsibilities.  There  is a  range of possibilities for 
remedial  action.  At  one  extreme  we  could  bring  political 
cooperation into  the  Community  itself and give it a  treaty 
basis.  My  fear is that  ~vithout a  Community  Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs  and  a  Community  Foreign Service  such  a  scheme 
would  prove difficult to  v.;ork.  In any  event  I  doubt  whether 
the  Governments  and  Parlia.ments of Member  States vvould  be 
ready  to  contemplat~ such  a  development in present 
circumstances.  Another  possibility would  be  to  create 
a  regular Secretariat, with  a  permanent seat,  and relative 
/constancy of ··i'1 
constancy of chairmanship.  A good  many  people  favour  this. 
But  I  see  a  risk that such a  Secretariat would  soon tangle 
with the other Community  institutions,  and  by  taking powers  away 
from national Ministries of Foreign Affairs,  tangle with  them 
too.  Its creation might  also dilute the  inestimable 
advantage political cooperation now  enjoys  of drawing  on 
the knowledge  and wisdom of the diplomatic  services of Member 
States. 
The  course which  I  personally favour would  be  to  improve 
the present machinery against  the  day when  a  major  :·  ,:_.v,,~ 
forward  in the construction of Europe  becomes  possible. 
This  ~;rould  be  a  less  formal  and  more~ pragmatic  approach. 
lol(;;;  could develop  the present  troika arrangements  by  which 
people of the outgoing Presidency help those of  tb:;;  J.:.ox:Lst:Lng 
Presidency and  those of the  forthcoming  Presidency to  ·run  the 
machine.  This would  help create  gr~ater continuity.  Like-
wise we  could try and move  towards  a  permanent  seat,  complete 
with permanent archives,  for political cooperation*  The 
present gipsy system by  which it moves  from  one  capital  to 
another every six months is good  for  tourism and  no  doubt 
educational  in many  ways.  But it has  its obvious  drawbacks. 
I  also think that Community  embassies  in third countries  should 
be used  even more  than now  for  European as well  as national 
purposes.  Finally I  believe that· political cooperation 
should make  more  use  of other Community  institutions,  in 
particular the Commission. 
At  the end  of the day  the  separation between  economic 
and political interests is artificial,  and  indeed 
scarcely sustainable in practice across  the range  of major 
issues with which the Community  is faced.  Hence  in the 
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long  term I  think  that political cooperation  and  the 
Community  institutions  should  proceed less in parallel 
than on convergent lines.  How  this can  be  achieved remains 
to  be  worked out.  For  the  moment  the  important  thing 
is to  develop all practical means  for making  political 
cooperation more  effective  and  to  set its longer-term 
objectives. 
As  I  said earlier the  Community  is  a  very young 
organisation.  It has  already achieved  an immense  amount, 
not least in the role it has  created for itself in  v~rld 
affairs.  I  conclude with  the  words  of Jean Monnet  to 
President Kennedy  in 1961:  "As  European union progresses 
the  European  Community  will make  a  more  and  more  efficient 
contribution to·the solution of  the  problems  besetting  the 
world."  It is in this spirit that the institutions 
·of  the  Community,  working  with  the Member  States,  will 
manage  and  project the  rol~ of  the  Community  in the outside 
.!\¥ 
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